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Preface 
This master thesis is the work of Gøran Berntsen and Bård Gamnes. We are both students at the 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) pursuing a Master of Science degree in 
Entrepreneurship.  The thesis is based on research we conducted between January and June 2011. 
The background for this work was a joint research program between Norway and India called 
INDNOR. Through participation in one project in the INDNOR program called Social Entrepreneurship: 
A Catalyst for Sustainable Development, we were given the opportunity to travel to India in January 
2011 to investigate social entrepreneurship, both in academic and practical contexts. In Jamshedpur, 
Mumbai and Ahmedabad we met with some of the world’s leading academics on the topic, and in 
Jhansi and Delhi we interviewed several successful social entrepreneurs and social investors. This 
interaction with the principals of Indian social entrepreneurship yielded a unique insight into the 
state of social ventures in the world today, and helped us form the ideas this thesis is based on. 
We wish to thank our thesis supervisor, Associate Professor Dr. Oecon. Lars Øystein Widding at the 
NTNU Entrepreneurship Center, for the invaluable support and feedback he has given. His insightful 
observations and passion for the subject has served as constructive guidance and generous 
encouragement throughout the process.  
We also wish to thank Professor Anil Gupta and Assistant Professor Ankur Sarin at the Indian Institute 
of Management in Ahmedabad, Professor Nirja Mattoo at the SP Jain Institute of Management and 
Research in Mumbai and Dr. T. Jayaraman at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Mumbai for 
taking the time to meet with us and patiently explain their research and opinions to us. We would 
also like to thank our case ventures and their representatives for the interviews and facilities tours 
they gave us; Founder CEO NK Chaudhary and Human Resources Manager Sanwar Yadev of Jaipur 
Rugs Company as well as Founder CEO Vijay Shukla and Entrepreneur-in-Residence Abhinav of Setu 
Ventures. In addition, we wish to thank Communication Director Peter Cleary of Vestergaard 
Frandsen for participation in phone interviews. 
Moreover, we wish to thank Dr. Cecilia Haskins at the NTNU Department of Industrial Economics and 
Technology Management for her helpful feedback, as well as Associate Professor Roger Klev at the 
same department for letting us leverage his network of venture managers when distributing the 
survey our second paper describes. Finally, our heartfelt gratitude goes out to our fellow students Ida 
Eikvåg Groth and Line Magnussen for being excellent travelling partners in India, for helping us codify 
our interviews and for commenting on our ideas early in the process. 
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The framework we propose in this thesis is hardly complete, but we hope that our perspectives on 
the nature of social ventures can serve as an inspiration for researchers and managers in the future. 
 
Trondheim June 14th, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
    
 Gøran Berntsen  Bård Gamnes  
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Process of developing problem 
statement 
When we started our work on this thesis in January 2011, the problem description we set out with 
was “(…) to investigate the link between social entrepreneurship and technology ventures.” In our 
early endeavors to analyze this problem, we examined social entrepreneurship literature and 
interviewed faculty and social entrepreneurs. In doing this, we came across several examples of 
social entrepreneurs with backgrounds from technology ventures, as well as examples of technology 
ventures that were social ventures themselves. This complicated our approach to the problem. We 
came to realize that a more fundamental question needed to be addressed before this link could be 
investigated: what exactly is a social venture? 
This essential question in mind, we dived into the literature in search of the defining quality of social 
ventures. Unsurprisingly, we quickly discovered that scholars in the field do not agree on what this is. 
A majority of the literature we examined seemed to simply assume that there’s some axiomatic 
division of all ventures into one of three sectors – the public sector, the business sector or the social 
sector – and most research focused only on one of these three. One clue was found, however, in our 
conversations with social entrepreneurship academics in India. They told us that in the field of social 
investing, ventures are expected to operate with a triple bottom line1. When accounting for the 
social part of this triple bottom line, both managers and investors we interviewed alternate between 
measuring the input (for example how many hours have been put in towards a particular goal) and 
the output (for example how many people have been affected). This led us to a belief that both 
factors – input and output, or in other words; social effort and social effect– are parts of what define 
ventures as social. 
With this insight, we focused our work on investigating the social effort and social effect of 
ventures. Our thesis contains two papers. The first is dedicated to developing a conceptual 
framework for describing the social dimensions of ventures, while the second paper details the 
development of a generic method for quantitatively applying the framework to ventures. 
 
The work on this thesis was begun on January 31st 2011, and concluded on June 13th 2011. Our 
supervisor has been Associate Professor Dr. Oecon. Lars Øystein Widding. 
  
                                                          
1
 This refers to the three areas where social investors wish to see results: financial, the environment and 
society 
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Abstract 
In this thesis we take the first steps towards developing a framework for evaluating the social efforts 
and effects of ventures, and investigate factors that may influence dynamics such a framework. Our 
work is divided into two papers. 
In the first paper (Thesis Paper A) we develop a conceptual framework for evaluating the social effort 
and social effect of ventures. The framework is theoretically based on literature reviews and in-
depth, qualitative case studies. The purpose is to build a platform for qualitative analysis of ventures 
that lets us compare their social performance with their social intentions. The resulting framework is 
a two-by-two matrix, describing four classes of ventures. Factors influencing a venture’s movement 
from one class in the framework to another are examined. We find that changing the social effort of 
a venture does not immediately change its social effects. Finally, we suggest that understanding the 
dynamics of this framework is useful for both researchers, and managers wishing to reposition 
themselves. 
In the second paper (Thesis Paper B) we take the framework one step further by replacing the two-
by-two matrix with two continuous dimensions. We then develop a quantitative method for 
evaluating ventures in the framework. In order to do so, we find a set of indicators to measure a 
venture’s social efforts and social effects. We apply this method to 19 ventures by conducting a 
survey. Our findings indicate a linear correlation between the social efforts and effects of the 
respondents, and that both ventures traditionally considered to be “social” and ventures considered 
to be “non-social” follow the same linearity. Surprisingly, we also find that none of our respondents 
score negatively on the social effects dimension. This leads us to question the sustainability of a 
venture with negative social effects as an important point for future research. 
Through both papers we see that an evaluation of the two dimensions “social efforts” and “social 
effects” provides a more accurate classification of ventures than a simple division of ventures into 
“social ventures” and “non-social ventures”. “Social Entrepreneurship in 2011”, the title of this 
thesis, is an increasingly important theme. It is important for both researchers and actors in this field 
to understand that any venture can have social properties. Questions of whether or not ventures are 
social may become superfluous. Instead, the focus should be on what effects ventures have on 
society and how they are performing compared to their social efforts. As society comes to expect 
more from all ventures, we believe that ventures, regardless of type, context, size, or industry, 
should be measured on the same dimensions. 
Our findings open for many interesting research possibilities, some of which are discussed in the 
papers. The applications of our work for venture managers are also discussed, and have to some 
degree been demonstrated already. In the second paper, we conducted a survey where we offered 
our respondents a report with their results. Several of the respondents said that the reports 
illustrated reality as they perceived it, and some found potential for improvement in areas they had 
not considered to be under their control. A sample report can be found after Thesis Paper B. 
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social efforts and effects of ventures 
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In this paper we develop a conceptual framework for classifying ventures based on their social efforts 
and social effects. The framework consists of four classes, each describing a unique combination of 
efforts and effects. The framework is developed by combining economics theory and social 
entrepreneurship theory with a case study of seven ventures. Three case ventures are then used to 
illustrate the model and its applications, illustrating its real-world applications. We observe 
obstructing factors to ventures changing their class in the framework, as well as the fact that 
changing a venture’s efforts does not immediately lead to changed effects. We propose that our 
framework is usable for academics analyzing ventures and managers in change processes. 
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Companies’ role in our society is evolving. Traditional economics theory has been mostly concerned 
with the company’s function as a conductor of market transactions (Williamson, 2005; Coase R. H., 
1960; Webster Jr., 1992; Coase R. H., 1937). Today, companies increasingly need to govern the 
perimeter of their operating environments (Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram, & Walsh, 1999) and 
participate in society as full-fledged citizens (Moon, Crane, & Matten, 2005), so other aspects of the 
company must be considered. With the emergence of stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) and the 
evolution of the theory of corporate social responsibility (Carroll, 1999) over the past decades, 
academics have established frameworks to describe both the causes and the mechanics of this 
increased participation. While corporate social responsibility has its critics, the fact remains that 
consumers, employees and investors are increasingly concerned with the social profiles of brands 
(Werther Jr. & Chandler, 2005; Middlemiss, 2003), employers (Nayar, 2011) and investment objects 
(Sparkes & Cowton, 2004). As a result, these frameworks are becoming significant in management 
practice as well as in academia. The implication is that corporate social responsibility and stakeholder 
concerns are appearing on the strategy agenda (Jantzi-Sustainalytic, 2010). 
At the same time, the nonprofit social sector is growing rapidly (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 
2006; Saxton & Benson, 2005). Simultaneously, for-profit social entrepreneurship is becoming more 
common (Perman, 2009), a phenomenon characterized by new ventures that combine social agendas 
with turning a profit. A result of the trends both in the business and the social sector is that the line 
between traditional ventures and social ventures is blurring. The classic notion that “corporations are 
bad” and “non-profit organizations are good” is becoming harder to defend. When multinational 
corporations (MNCs) prove both able and willing to precipitate great social changes (Egels, 2005), 
while social ventures such as microfinance organizations are shown to do more harm and less good 
than originally expected (Bateman & Chang, 2008), a comparison of social effort and social effect is 
due. While models for classifying various types of social and traditional ventures exist (Neck, Brush, & 
Allen, 2009), economics, business and entrepreneurship literature often deal exclusively with either 
the ventures in the business sector or ventures in the social sector. When discussing social effort and 
social impact, however, it makes sense to treat all ventures in the same framework.  
In this paper, we will attempt to meet this requirement by developing a theoretical framework for 
classifying ventures based on their social effort and their social effect. We will begin by developing an 
abstract framework, and then illustrate the use of the framework through the analysis of three case 
ventures. We will further explore the dynamics of the framework, and examine which mechanisms 
exist to aid or to prevent ventures from altering their position in the framework. 
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The framework we propose is a two-dimensional system. We wish to treat both social and traditional 
ventures in the same framework, and we want to look at the correlation between what they want to 
do and what they actually achieve. One dimension we will present is the social effort of ventures - to 
what degree ventures engage in initiatives for the benefit of society. An example of how to approach 
this dimension is by looking at the ventures’ mission statements and goals, as these are good 
indicators of venture behavior (Neck, Brush, & Allen, 2009). Because the purpose of the framework is 
to also evaluate the social output of ventures, the other dimension will represent social effect of 
ventures. This dimension describes the results of the social efforts ventures engage in, as well as 
inadvertent effects of the venture’s activities. 
Social effect
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Figure 1: Social input and output 
As shown in Figure 1, we have a two-dimensional framework. On the social effort axis, ventures can 
either be neutral (meaning no social efforts are made), placing them at the bottom of the 
framework, or make some kind of effort which would place them higher up. On the social effect axis 
ventures can either have a positive impact, no impact or a negative impact on society, meaning this 
axis must extend into negative space as well. 
All ventures can be placed somewhere in this framework. In addition, ventures can change their 
position in the framework over time. Before we go on to illustrate this, however, we need to refine 
the framework, as “Social effort” and “social effect” are not well-defined terms. 
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The vertical axis – the social effort axis – will describe ventures’ goals and behavior. Certainly, 
ventures differ greatly in how socially aware and responsible they are. Some ventures, such as most 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have an agenda where social impact is put above profits. 
Other ventures set themselves social missions alongside the ever-present object of returning profits 
to shareholders. It could be for marketing reasons, because they believe it will be profitable in the 
long run, or because of the philanthropic nature of their owners. Put in a different term, different 
ventures have different intentions, and we will explore some of the mechanics that lead to social 
intentions. 
Ventures that exist primarily for the purpose of achieving some social mission rather than for the 
purpose of profits we collectively call social ventures. This term includes both purely non-profit 
ventures, such as many humanitarian and relief organizations, and for-profit social ventures. The 
latter are ventures that are for-profit businesses, but whose primary goal is social impact. Having 
stated social missions, these ventures are located on the upper part of the social effort axis of the 
framework, as their intentions are clearly positive. 
In a recent blog post, HCL Technologies CEO Vineet Nayar observed that young business people 
expect ventures to accept a social responsibility (Nayar, 2011), which is very much in tune with the 
development of the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) over the past decades. With 
increasing globalization and the establishment of multinational corporations (MNCs) as the pillars of 
the global economy, society has come to expect more from ventures, and CSR is one response to 
this. While proponents of CSR claim the concept can trace its roots all the way back to Adam Smith’s 
ideas of honesty and justice in the market (Li, Zhang, Li, Zu, Zhao, & Zhao, 2011), it is only in recent 
years that CSR has emerged on the strategy agenda of ventures worldwide. The World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development defines CSR as “…the continuing commitment by business to 
behave ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the 
workforce and their families as well as of the local community and society at large” (WBCSD, 1999), a 
wide definition that is nevertheless useful in that it recognizes a responsibility to stakeholders apart 
from shareholders.  
A common criticism of CSR is that CSR in many cases doesn’t have any real impact on the ventures’ 
operations, apart from being present on the marketing budget (McKibben, 2006). Critics question the 
motives behind CSR, accusing ventures of building CSR into their brands purely as a means to boost 
sales and increase profits. However, even if the ultimate motives are increased profits, the results of 
working social responsibility into a brand can have valuable effects for society. One important such 
effect is how employees consider the brand they work with, as pointed out by Øivind Hagen: 
“Making social values part of the brand (…) challenges the distinction between external and internal 
communication. Making a moral statement through branding of CSR intentions creates expectations 
with both external and internal stakeholders, and it puts pressure on employees to live up to the 
promises.” (Hagen, 2008) 
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There’s a complex effect taking place here. As stakeholders’ expectations of ventures grow to include 
social responsibility, ventures brand themselves to appear to comply with these expectations, and by 
branding themselves in this way, they may in turn change the way they operate. 
Porter and Kramer, two highly acclaimed economists from Harvard University, recently published an 
article called Creating Shared Value (Porter & Kramer, 2011). Ventures and their surrounding 
business environments are closely intertwined, and ventures should therefore focus on building 
profitable environments to operate in. This will lead to new opportunities, enabling the ventures to 
achieve further economic growth. In other words, creating shared value is not a cost for a venture, 
but can be perceived as a long-term (or sometimes short-term) investment for building a more 
sustainable future. A classic “mistake” in the world of business is setting short-term financial goals, 
which might give shareholders greater returns today, but might harm the business in the long run. 
There are three ways to achieve shared value according to Porter and Kramer: Reconceiving products 
and markets – adapting products to their markets, and investigating non-traditional markets – can 
lead to new opportunities by opening doors not previously available. Redefining productivity in the 
value chain, in other words focusing on other than the direct economic aspects of productivity can 
lead to great savings in cost for fuel, recycling and resources usage. Enabling local cluster 
development can create more opportunities and help build the market to the venture’s advantage. 
When improving infrastructure and relations to surrounding organizations and people, the venture 
can increase sales and open new markets that have previously been inaccessible. In sum, shared 
value creation strategies indicate positive social intentions. 
Whether a venture’s mission is social in nature or a venture is committed to CSR or creating shared 
value for business reasons, a venture prepared to act socially responsible can be said to have social 
intentions. What we have not discussed is the relative strength of these intentions. A humanitarian 
organization like the Red Cross, whose mission is to “provide relief to victims of disaster and help 
people prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies” (Red Cross, 2011) clearly has strong social 
intentions. Less obvious are the social intentions of a corporation like Statoil ASA, whose corporate 
values include the somewhat vague phrase “demonstrate social responsibility and contribute to 
sustainable development”. It could be argued that the intentions of these two ventures are worlds 
apart. However, that would require some attempt to quantify intent, something that falls outside the 
scope of the abstract framework we are proposing. Rather, we will use a qualitative approach in 
assessing whether or not a venture’s intentions are social. 
Before we can examine the impact ventures impose on society, we need to explore the term 
externalities. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics defines the term as: 
“(…) indirect effects of consumptions or production activity, that is, effects on agents other than the 
originator of such activity which do not work through the price system.” (Laffont, 2008) 
What does this mean in terms of social effect and our framework? In the view of traditional 
economics, ventures exist to maximize profits for shareholders (Friedman, 1970). Any side-effect the 
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venture’s activities has on its environment that does not directly relate to this purpose is referred to 
as an externality. In order to better understand the concept of externalities, let us first consider the 
concept of utility. Utility describes the relative satisfaction of individuals. Although impossible to 
measure in reality, it is nevertheless very useful as an abstract concept, because we can deduce 
whether an individual’s utility is increased or decreased. An externality can be defined as any change 
in the utility of a bystander to a transaction. If ventures and consumers engage in a transaction that 
has some effect on the utility of a third party, the transaction causes an externality. Externalities can 
be either positive or negative - a negative externality decreases the bystander’s utility, while a 
positive externality increases it.  
In utilitarianism, as developed by John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham early in the 19th century, the 
moral value of any action is evaluated based on its usefulness in maximizing the sum of all 
individual’s utility (Stigler, 1950). In this view, an action is considered beneficial to society given that 
it benefits more than it harms. An implication is that an action can be “good” even though it incurs 
costs on one subset of society, given that a different subset gains sufficiently. That means the social 
benefit can be a direct profit for the involved parties while the social cost is a negative externality. 
A more fine-grained way to evaluate an action is found in the principle of Pareto efficiency. This 
principle says that any action in the market is only Pareto efficient if at least one individual is better 
off and no individuals are worse off for it. In other words, an action is Pareto efficient if no individuals 
experience a decreased utility, while at least one individual experience an increased utility. Or, in 
terms of externalities, an action is Pareto efficient if no negative externalities are incurred. If the 
social benefit of the action is evaluated based on its Pareto efficiency, then there can be no doubt 
that a Pareto efficient action is also an action for the betterment of society (even should it only affect 
one individual). A problem with this evaluation lies in the subjective-individualistic nature of utility, 
meaning that any individual is free to determine what does and does not affect his or her own utility. 
This implies that any action in practice can be said to have indirect effects, and there will always be 
some individual whose utility is affected (Salinas, 2003).  In practice, all actions will incur both 
positive and negative externalities. 
For the purposes of this framework, a version of utilitarianism will suffice for evaluating the social 
benefit of an action. We accept that we must deal with sums of externalities as we concede that 
there will always be negative externalities. However, we will not accept that profit-enhancing 
activities with no positive externalities are socially beneficial. In order to fit social ventures into this 
model, we will also include intended social benefits resulting from a venture’s activities in the term 
“positive externalities”. Accepting that every action will carry both positive and negative externalities 
with it, we can evaluate the benefit of the action based on the sum of externalities. We can then 
evaluate the social impact of a venture as the sum of externalities of all their activities. 
Let us now consider how ventures, particularly traditional for-profit ventures, relate to externalities. 
As an isolated unit, the traditional venture is expected to make profitable choices at any junction. If 
the venture can avoid a cost, for example by passing this cost on to the rest of society, the profit goes 
up. Ventures are in fact expected to externalize as many costs as possible – not because they are evil, 
but because that is how the rules of our economy have made them. As put by Robert Monks: 
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“A corporation is an externalizing machine in the same way that a shark is a killing machine. Each one 
is designed in a very efficient way to accomplish particular objectives. In the achievement of those 
objectives, there isn’t any question of malevolence or will. The venture has within it – and the shark 
has within it – those characteristics that enable it to do that for which it was designed.” (Monks, 
2005) 
If the venture’s role is to externalize costs, then it is the role of regulatory bodies to be the opposite 
force. Governments pass laws to tax negative externalities, forcing ventures to “internalize” the costs 
of those externalities that are deemed damaging to society at large (like pollution). In the same spirit, 
laws are passed that subsidize positive externalities, making it profitable for ventures to engage in 
activities that carry benefits to society. Unfortunately, because externalities are so hard to quantify, 
it is hard to accurately tax negative externalities and subsidize positive ones. But is that a problem? 
Ronald Coase suggested in what has become known as the “Coase Theorem” (Coase R. H., 1960), 
that we don’t, in fact, need regulatory bodies to tax and subsidize externalities given that we have 
well-defined property rights and low transaction costs. Under these conditions, a self-regulating 
effect arises that we will refer to as the “Coase effect”. If a venture wishes to engage in some 
transaction that will have adverse effects on a bystander’s utility function, and if these effects are 
expressed in some action upon something that is the property of that bystander, the venture must 
first purchase the right to initiate that transaction from the bystander. If the original transaction is 
more valuable to the venture than the price of compensating the bystander, including the 
transaction cost of the compensation, it will make sense to do so. The utility of the bystander 
remains the same and the venture creates some value, meaning the transaction is Pareto efficient.  
While the Coase effect can explain some internalization, it is important to remember that the Coase 
Theorem only works under a set of ideal assumptions. While the idea of markets with sufficiently low 
transaction costs offers its own problems, the assumption that property rights are well-defined are in 
many cases difficult to defend. Who owns the right for industry to release carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere? Who should be compensated if over-use of antibiotics leads to more resistant bacteria, 
and new diseases evolve, or if the opening of a new liquor store leads to increase crime in the 
neighborhood? The answer is that all of us together – that is our society – own these property rights. 
To represent society and manage these rights, we have governments. We give our governments the 
mandate to introduce taxes and subsidies in order to herd ventures to do what is best for all of us. 
Deciding which externalities are severe enough – that is, affect sufficiently many individuals’ utility 
function to a sufficient degree – to be taxed or subsidized is left to the law-makers, who we must 
assume have society’s interest in mind. 
So far we’ve considered two mechanisms that make a venture internalize their externalities: direct 
market mechanisms (the Coase effects) or governments forcing and coercing internalizations by 
taxing or subsidizing activities. In addition, ventures can voluntarily choose to internalize 
externalities, either by refraining from externalizing costs to begin with, or by voluntarily picking up 
the bill for externalities. To what degree a venture chooses to do this depends, of course, on the 
venture’s social intentions. 
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Having explored both social intentions and externalities, we are now equipped to return to the 
framework. We redefine the vertical axis as Intentions. The idea is that ventures can be placed 
vertically in the framework based on their social intentions. Quantifying intentions and judging 
different ventures relatively to one another, however, is difficult, and especially so when we consider 
purely social ventures in the same framework as traditional for-profit ventures. Because of this, we 
make the (social) Intentions axis binary. A venture that has social benefits as part of their mission 
statement or values, is placed in the upper part of the framework, while a venture that does not, is 
placed in the lower part. 
The horizontal axis we redefine in terms of externalities, or more specifically, Sum of Externalities. 
Even though one activity may impose positive externalities on one subset of society, another activity 
(or even the same activity) may impose negative externalities on another subset of society, and this 
axis will represent the sum of all the venture’s externalities in all of society. As with social intentions, 
quantifying the sum of externalities is difficult. For our purposes, it will suffice to know if the sum is a 
positive one or a negative one. We therefore make this axis binary as well. The result is a two-by-two 
matrix. For ease of reference, each quadrant in the matrix is given a nickname to illustrate the 
ventures it describes. 
Posers Angels
Sharks Bees
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Figure 2: The intentions-externalities framework 
Nickname inspired by Monks’ “externalizing machine” metaphor (Monks, 2005), the Sharks in the 
lower left-hand quadrant are the ventures that have no social intentions, and whose sum of 
externalities is negative. We assume that most traditional for-profit ventures fit into this quadrant. 
Indeed, if one accepts Friedman’s opinion on what the purpose of a venture is, this is exactly where 
all traditional ventures are supposed to be. However, because Sharks cause negative externalities, it 
is in society’s interest that Sharks not remain Sharks. Some Sharks will therefore try to change their 
positions. Unfortunately, there is an inertia effect when attempting to change a venture’s position in 
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the framework. That is, changing a venture’s intention does not immediately change the venture’s 
sum of externalities, because the sum of externalities is a complex property constructed by many 
independent variables. 
In addition to the inertia effect, there are mechanisms that prevent ventures from leaving Shark 
status. One such mechanism is the taxation that is intended to force Sharks to internalize 
externalities. This forced change can cause them to design strategies to circumvent these 
regulations, and actively avoid internalization of externalities. In addition, paying the taxes can result 
in ventures “resting on their laurels”, using the taxes as an excuse to not act socially responsible in 
other areas. Sharks with a strong short-term profitability focus will be particularly affected, as they 
are prevented from actually making the investments required to change. This incurs an unwillingness 
to change their intentions. As a result, ventures that could otherwise have been coerced to change 
their intentions are stuck in the role of Sharks. 
While Sharks are natural consequences of free markets and the way our economy works, for-profit 
ventures are increasingly volunteering to internalize externalities as they adopt CSR policies and shift 
their focuses towards creating shared value. It is, therefore, not unlikely that we will see more 
ventures moving away from Shark status in the future. 
In the diagonally opposite quadrant are the ventures that have a declared social mission, and 
manage to carry it out successfully so that the sum of their externalities is positive. We call these 
ventures Angels. Ventures that start out in and remain in this role throughout their existence, that 
we will call “Born Angels”, are typically NGOs and non-profit social ventures. Their sole purpose is to 
benefit some subset of society and they are therefore more inclined to ensure a positive sum of 
externalities in all parts of the value chain and their own operations (Dees J. G., 1998). Because of the 
emerging trend of social purpose for-profit ventures (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006), it can 
be assumed that more Born Angels will be founded in the time to come. 
Ventures in the lower right corner are ventures that have no social mission, but still have a positive 
sum of externalities. This can be because the nature of their business is such that it carries social 
benefits, and they cause few negative externalities. An example can be a management consultancy 
firm that employs highly educated consultants, as well as providing them with further education. This 
positively impacts the education level of the work force, which is a positive externality. We use Bees 
as an analogy, because they benefit their surroundings by pollinating local flora as a side effect of 
honey production. 
Intuitively, this appears to be the optimal quadrant for any for-profit venture. Bees have a positive 
sum of externalities, meaning they are beneficial to society. At the same time, they have no social 
missions, meaning they can focus their efforts on maximizing profits for their shareholders. One 
question to beware, however, is whether a Bee is truly performing according to its mission. Although 
there are likely to be cases of genuine Bees (ventures whose primary business carries truly positive 
externalities with it), Sharks that internalize sufficiently could also appear as Bees. Although this 
would be a benefit for society, it could be argued that shareholders aren’t getting the management 
or results they are paying for. 
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In the upper left corner are ventures with stated social missions who still incur a negative sum of 
externalities. This can be either because their stated missions aren’t taken seriously, as happens 
when CSR is a pure marketing initiative, or because their positive externalities are insufficient to 
offset their negative ones. Either way, they are unable or unwilling to net a positive impact on 
society, and we have nicknamed them Posers.  
One interesting example of a mechanism that can prevent Posers from achieving Angel status can be 
found in a case-review from 2008 by NTNU researcher Øivind Hagen. He examined the Norwegian 
office chair manufacturer HÅG (Hagen, 2008), a company that began branding itself as a CSR pioneer 
in the early 1990s. While their intent had clearly changed, moving them from Shark to Poser status, 
operations and activities struggled to follow. HÅG had a chairman who appeared often in media, 
working CSR into the brand, which lead to high expectations from external stakeholders. A result was 
that organizational members became blinded by their own rhetoric. “Leading actors within HÅG 
*were+ seduced by the very image the company created of itself.” (Hagen, 2008) These key employees 
were convinced HÅG’s CSR had led to positive social impact already and as such felt no compulsion to 
contribute further. Both these effects are detrimental to employee attitudes towards CSR, and 
prevent ventures from moving from Poser to Angel status. 
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In this paper we have sought to describe the social efforts and effects of ventures in general, 
regardless of type of venture (social or traditional). The firmly established field of economics offers 
many insights into either type of venture, while the relatively fresh academic field of social 
entrepreneurship offers perspectives on the efforts and effects of social ventures. From our initial 
forays into the social ventures theme, we found that there was a discrepancy between how social 
ventures were portrayed in the literature and how they perceived themselves. This especially held 
true for for-profit social ventures. This led us to believe that there was no reason social ventures 
could not be described in the same framework as traditional ventures. However, this is uncommon in 
both economics and in the entrepreneurship field. In order to combine ideas from both fields with 
empirical observations, we chose a qualitative, inductive approach to our research. This let us build 
our theory bottom-up based on observations from both literature and our empirical data (Bryman, 
2001). 
In order to build our theory, we conducted a “cross-sectional design with case-study elements” 
(Bryman, 2001). We investigated a set of case ventures based on their definition as social venture or 
traditional venture, but at the same time we looked at all ventures as the same type of societal 
mechanism. For each of 7 case ventures, we conducted semi-structured interviews with founders 
and key employees, and combined this with information gathered from the ventures’ web pages and 
news stories about the ventures 
When developing a new model or a new theoretical approach to a phenomenon, the systematic 
approach in Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) is appropriate. Codifying the data gathered 
from the case ventures into suitable categories let us make relevant observations and find common 
factors and differences. We then narrowed down the case ventures, selecting the ventures that were 
most illustrative to show how the broader categories function. This let us illustrate the functionality 
of the framework. 
We also conducted a recursive document analysis, or ethnographic content analysis, (Altheide, 1996) 
initially using categories as guides when analyzing documents for case ventures, but then altering the 
categories based on findings. When we felt we had reached theoretical saturation (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998), we placed the categories into the model and arrived at the framework shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 3 shows the framework development process. While our initial literature review led us to 
conduct case venture interviews, we relied on supplementary literature from the fields of economics, 
business ethics and social entrepreneurship throughout the process of working with the cases and 
developing the framework.  
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Figure 3: The framework development process 
Table 1 shows some examples of how concepts from literature and the cases led us to our final 
framework. 
Table 1: Examples of concepts synthesized from sources into our framework 
Initial literature review Case venture interviews 
Case venture 
document analysis 
Resulting 
categories 
Distinction on venture 
type based on goals and 
business model: Social 
ventures or traditional 
ventures (Martin & 
Osberg, 2007) 
Social problems are the 
same, regardless of how 
your business model 
addresses them. 
 
Different venture types 
only depend on the best 
way to solve the problem. 
 
Difference lies in primary 
objective for the 
company. (Shukla, 2011) 
Primary objective is 
closely related to 
mission and vision 
statements and 
explicit goals for the 
venture. 
(Setu Ventures, 
2011) 
Social effort 
(Intentions) 
Distinction on social 
ventures (SV):  
Non-profit SV or For-
profit SV (Dees J. , 1996) 
Distinction on different 
social goals: CSR, Social 
Ventures (Austin, 
Stevenson, & Wei-
Skillern, 2006) 
    
Distinction between 
market, economic or 
social impact. (Neck, 
Brush, & Allen, 2009) 
Social and economic 
impact are not mutually 
exclusive. Both can be 
achieved by applying 
novel business models. 
(Cleary, 2011) 
Ventures reports 
both on direct 
output and on their 
impact on their 
surroundings. 
(Jaipur Rugs 
Company, 2011) 
Social Effects 
(Sum of 
externalities) 
Distinction on primary 
output and externalities 
(Cornes & Sandler, 
1986) 
Ventures are concerned 
with both when looking 
at social and 
environmental aspects, 
calls it their total impact. 
(Chaudhary, 2011) 
Initial 
literature 
review 
Case 
venture 
interviews 
Case 
venture 
selection 
Case 
ventures 
document 
analysis 
Resulting 
categories 
Supplementary literature 
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Having examined the case ventures, we selected three descriptive cases to illustrate the usefulness 
of the framework. While the three cases used were chosen because they provided the best 
descriptive match for the framework, all seven cases collected contributed insights in the framework 
creation. For each case the social intent was determined based on the venture’s mission statement, 
core values and business model. The sum of the venture’s externalities was extrapolated from the 
founder’s account as well as from the account of external stakeholders, documents and other 
researchers’ case studies. 
This method, while highly qualitative in nature, allowed us to evaluate each case venture’s position in 
the framework. Additionally, we have mapped their historical movement in the framework, based on 
the same data sources. 
This kind of qualitative case study gives a deep and rich knowledge of the case companies studied, 
but risks errors when attempting to generalize the findings. However, case studies are useful when 
studying a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context as we have been doing (Yin, 2002), and 
the method has helped us in the development of our framework. The method also ensures that our 
framework has undergone repeated verification during the theory development (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Additionally, the method let us evaluate the real-world application of the framework on cases into 
which we had deep insight. 
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The ventures we have analyzed in this paper are the rug manufacturer Jaipur Rugs Company, the 
investment fund Setu Ventures and textile-manufacturer-turned-social-venture Vestergaard 
Frandsen. The ventures are presented and analyzed below. 
The Indian company Jaipur Rugs Company (JRC) is one of the leading manufacturers of handmade 
carpets in India. They currently employ over 40.000 artisans throughout the country. Each artisan is 
their own entrepreneur, as they are not employed directly by the company. The company’s value 
chain ensures sales to over 20 countries world-wide, with an annual turn-over in 2008-2009 of over 
$14 million (Jaipur Rugs Company, 2011). 
JRC’s business concept and mission is in short to “remove the middle-man” (Chaudhary, 2011). JRC 
founder CEO Nand Kishore Chaudhary started in the rug industry in 1978 because he saw that middle 
men in the industry did little work and took huge profits from the process, leaving the artisans with 
low income. He identified this as a defect in the market and saw the potential of creating a more 
effective business filling the gap (Kirzner, 1999). JRC therefore takes control of the entire value chain 
from wool import to sales offices. They want to enable their artisans to become their own 
entrepreneurs by helping them to buy their own weaving looms and thereby become a partner to 
JRC.  
JRC has existed for many years, and for simplicity we choose to refer to the company and its 
founder’s business as JRC, even before the company itself was established. The company history can 
be divided into two main phases as their intentions changed. The transmission from one phase to 
another has been a gradual process but there has been a marked change in the goals and the 
organization nonetheless.  
JRC started out as a company with two looms and the intention of creating profits for Mr. Chaudhary 
and his fellow founders. As such, they did not at this time have a clear goal or vision of helping 
people. At this point – in the first phase – their social intentions were neutral, placing them in the 
lower part of the framework. A few years after starting, Chaudhary realized the positive effects his 
business had on its surroundings; employing workers in rural India, paying above-market wages and 
improving the quality of life for the artisans. He decided to pursue these positive effects further, and 
made this the primary objective for the company. JRC’s purpose was changed to improving the living 
standards for artisans. This marked the entrance to the second phase of the company, where the 
intentions are positive. The operations in this phase shifted towards what Porter and Cramer refers 
to as creating shared value as the company invested in local cluster development in the artisan 
villages.  
The fact that JRC controls their entire value chain enables them to ensure that value is evenly 
distributed throughout the different entities. They buy and store the wool, send the exact needed 
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amount for a rug to artisans, collect the finished rugs and sell the rugs directly to end users in 
western markets.   
By controlling the value chain, JRC work closely with their artisans, educating them and helping them 
become better weavers. They have also expanded their business by setting up sales offices in the US, 
redefining the markets previously unavailable to Indian rugs. By eliminating the third-party reseller, 
JRC ensures a fair distribution of profits in the value chain. In addition, the control allows them to 
secure an effective distribution of resources. In order for JRC to effectively work with their artisans, 
they need to build infrastructure connecting the villages to distribution channels, as well as help in 
raising the living standards in the villages through health care. All these activities are in line with 
Porter and Cramer’s shared value creation concept. 
JRC established the Jaipur Rugs Foundation (JRF) in 2004 showing a clear social dedication as this is 
purely a voluntary non-profit organization. JRF works solely for the well-being of carpet weavers, not 
only for JRC artisans, but for carpet weavers in other parts of India as well. JRC is responsible for most 
of the funding to the foundation, thereby giving back some of its profits directly to its artisans, 
further ensuring positive externalities for JRC. 
The positive impacts JRC have on the communities through health care, education, economic growth 
and infrastructure improvements by far outnumber their negative effects. This puts their sum of 
externalities as a positive. What is interesting is that this has always been true, even in the first phase 
of the history when JRC did not have the same social mission. 
JRC’s intentions have changed throughout the history of the company. The two phases of the 
company shows a movement in our model. Their intentions changed from the lower part to the 
upper part of our model. Interestingly, the sum of their externalities has always been positive. While 
they have increased the living standards of their artisans, this was true in both phases. The 
combination of their mission, and their business model and operations, clearly classifies JRC as an 
Angel in the model today. With the establishment of the JRF in 2004, they further strengthened their 
position as an Angel. JRC was a Bee in the first phase, but as their intentions changed they have 
moved up to become an Angel. 
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Figure 4: Jaipur Rugs Co. in the model 
Setu Ventures (Setu) is a small investment fund in Gurgaon (Delhi) in India, investing in early-phase 
start-ups. Their mission reflects the social ideology of founder Vijay Shukla: to facilitate new startups 
and create jobs, by offering capital, advice and space in an incubator. In the words of Mr. Shukla: 
“Setu is the kindergarten of business” (Shukla, 2011). The fund operates with a double bottom line, 
measuring success both in financial performance and social performance by the number of 
businesses started and jobs created.  
The fund was founded in 2009, and has at the time of writing invested in twelve small start-ups 
employing in total between 85 and 90 people. As all the investment objects are still in early phases, it 
is too early to say anything for sure about the long-term social impact of the investments, let alone 
about the financial performance of the fund, but according to Mr. Shukla, they are ahead of 
expectations at this point, and at least ten of the twelve portfolio companies are looking very 
promising. 
Before Mr. Shukla founded Setu Ventures, he had co-founded four other companies, among these 
the very successful mobile service provider ValueFirst. Already a successful businessman, his fifth 
venture, Setu Ventures, was founded with a social mission in mind – to create sustainable businesses 
and thus create new jobs. While the company is a for-profit venture (Mr. Shukla expects as much as 
7-8X appreciation on their investments over a five-year period) their investment profile is clearly 
affected by their social mission, and their intentions are positive. 
As an investment fund and investment advisory company, Setu have few activities that can be 
claimed to incur direct externalities. A thorough evaluation of Setu’s portfolio companies could help 
us map Setu’s indirect externalities. However, this would require an investigation outside the scope 
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of this paper. We will be content with establishing that, based on the information available at the 
time of writing, none of the portfolio companies incur negative externalities sufficient to offset the 
benefit of the job creation they have achieved. As Jaipur Rugs, Setu is creating shared value, since 
they want to enable local businesses to prosper and thereby create jobs. Using this as an indirect 
metric of Setu’s sum of externalities, we ascertain that Setu have a net positive influence on its 
surroundings. 
Having intentions to invest in a socially responsible manner, and netting a positive sum of 
externalities, Setu is placed in the upper right corner of our model; a place it has held throughout its 
short history. This is an example of the interesting phenomenon Born Angel – a company that has 
held Angel status since incorporation, and continues to do so. 
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Figure 5: Setu in the model 
Founded in 1957 in Denmark as an industrial clothing manufacturer, Vestergaard Frandsen (VF) is 
today a world leader in disease control products. The company was started by Kaj Vestergaard 
Frandsen, and it has remained a family-run business since. Kaj’s son, Torben, took over the business 
in 1970, and in 1992 Kaj’s grandson Mikkel became involved in the business. Mikkel was already a 
social entrepreneur exporting cars to Africa, but decided to work in the family business instead, 
seeing a great potential to do good from there (Freedman, 2005).  
Mikkel introduced a unique business model, which he refers to as Humanitarian Entrepreneurship. 
This business model has turned creating positive social change into their core mission while they still 
focus on making a sustainable profitable business. Today, VF has several life-changing products 
ranging from PermaNet, a long-lasting insecticidal net, to LifeStraw, a point-of-use water filter that 
provides clean water to people all over the world. At the same time, VF is a highly profitable business 
and reached over $500 million in revenues in 2010 (Cleary, 2011). 
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VF started out as a pure for-profit company, not focusing on their externalities. However, when 
Mikkel V. Frandsen became CEO in the 1990s, the core mission of the company changed. Mikkel 
changed the purpose of the company into solving social problems, focusing on the UN’s millennium 
goals (Vestergaard Frandsen, 2011). Their Humanitarian Entrepreneurship business model proves 
their movement in intentions from neutral to positive. This was not just a CSR PR stunt, but a genuine 
intent of imposing positive social change by helping others improve their quality of life. 
It has proven difficult to find independent information about VF’s suppliers and their internal CSR 
policy today. Based on an interview with Peter Cleary, the Communications and Public Relations 
Director for VF, the company works on ensuring good working conditions for all employees, 
regardless of where in the world they work. 
In 1957 in Denmark, the Environmental Protection Act of 1974 and the Cleaner Technology programs 
introduced in 1986, had not yet been introduced. These laws regulate chemical emissions and 
operational procedures (Søndergård, Hansen, & Holm, 2004) in industries. In addition, the textile and 
clothing industry is “(…) a labour-intensive, low wage industry (…)” (Nordås, 2004). This combined 
with VF’s originally neutral intentions, leads us to assume that they imposed negative externalities. 
When Mikkel changed their intentions, the entire venture changed their way of operating. The 
business model basically became to provide social change for end-users, while leveraging other 
externalities to provide profits. One example of how their business model works is a campaign 
launched in 2011, where VF is donating LifeStraw water filters to over 900 000 households in Kenya, 
covering almost 90% of the population that doesn’t have municipal water sources (Vestergaard 
Frandsen, 2011). The company has spent over $30 million on the project, and at first sight it would 
seem like a philanthropic campaign. However, by donating the LifeStraws, VF is actually reducing 
carbon emissions. This is because Kenyans today boil water using fossil fuels to obtain clean drinking 
water. The carbon credits earned from reducing these emissions are given to VF by the Kenyan 
government, allowing VF to sell them to western markets, generating profits for the company. In 
addition, thousands of Kenyans will be employed to distribute and maintain the Lifestraws. VF 
ensures that infrastructure is improved, building a maintenance industry in connection with the 
product. In this sense, they are redefining the market and enabling local cluster development. The 
project also gives VF incentives for reinvesting and ensuring the quality of the project, as their carbon 
credit revenue is directly linked to the project’s performance. In other words they secure shared 
value for the entire value chain (Porter & Kramer, 2011). 
Their influence on their externalities has, as shown, changed from negative to positive. This was not a 
sudden process however. While changing their mission was almost an overnight process, changing 
their entire value chain and operations was a much greater task.  
VF started out in 1957 as a Shark in the bottom left quadrant of the model because of the 
combination of their neutral intentions and the fact that they were a 1950s clothing manufacturer 
which indicates negative externalities. Then their novel Humanitarian Entrepreneurship business 
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model was introduced, changing the way the company was working. With the change in mission, VF 
moved up in the framework. However, since the change in what they actually achieved externally 
was a gradual process, they moved via Posers before reaching Angel status, which they have today. 
VF proves that solving social problems, while maintaining positive externalities, is possible (and can 
be highly profitable). 
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Figure 6: Vestergaard Frandsen in the model 
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As shown in the cases, there can be several reasons for ventures to change their position in the 
framework. While we have found examples of ventures trying to move toward the right end of the 
framework, we also found that this doesn’t happen by itself. For a Shark to start voluntarily 
internalizing externalities requires some change in intentions. However, adopting a socially beneficial 
intent does not automatically imply the company changing its sum of externalities immediately. 
Changing externalities is a gradual and longer process, not necessarily directly linked to a change in 
intentions. Based on the inertia and self-reinforcing mechanisms previously described, we find some 
interesting dynamics when ventures are moving in the model. 
Even though there are reinforcing factors in the quadrants in the framework, and inertia effects 
associated with moving around in the framework, both Vestergaard Frandsen and Jaipur Rugs 
Company have moved between the different classes as showed in the case research. From what we 
have seen, it seems likely that some movements are more common than others, and some are 
unlikely or even impossible. 
As seen in the cases, moving from neutral intentions to positive can result from a change in mission 
or values for ventures. This has to be a clear direction set by management, and it has to be genuine 
in order for the venture to achieve movement in our framework. In other words, a PR campaign using 
CSR as a pure buzzword will probably not lead to the company changing position. Some relevant 
events that can lead to real change in intentions are ownership change or a forced change from 
external market forces. 
Ownership change happens often in the business world, and since a venture’s direction often is a 
reflection of its management’s intent (Bird, 1988) the change in ownership and management can 
lead to a genuine change in intentions. This was also the case in our case company, Vestergaard 
Frandsen, where the change of CEO caused a companywide change in policy and intentions. The 
change can also happen the other way, which can be the case in for-profit social ventures where the 
entrepreneur is forced to issue new stocks when doing emissions. As the entrepreneur’s ownership 
becomes diluted, he or she is often replaced by more experienced CEOs. In the business and 
investment world, a more seasoned and experienced CEO is often synonymous with a more profit-
seeking CEO, leading to a change in the venture’s intentions downward in the framework. The focus 
on stakeholder value can change into a focus on maximizing shareholder value, which could mean an 
intention towards increasing externalization as implied by Monks’ shark analogy (Monks, 2005). 
Forced change from the market is becoming more common as the media makes business operations 
more transparent and puts pressure on ventures to change their operations (Garriga & Melé, 2004). 
Oil spills, working conditions for third world employees or irresponsible environmental policies are 
some examples of factors that may lead to boycotts or a public outcry for change when exposed in 
the media. One can argue that this is not a voluntary change for the company that has to change its 
intentions, and that this surely can be considered to be a branding issue. However, as seen in for 
instance major oil spill catastrophes, the change can be genuine (Hooghiemstra, 2000), and the news 
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stories can even be a wakeup call for the management that might not have realized the negative 
impacts they had on their surroundings (Hagen, 2008). 
More specifically for the vertical movement, moving from Shark to Poser is possible when changing 
leadership and management as seen in the Vestergaard Frandsen case. Movement the other way, 
from Poser to Shark is also probable if ownership changes through an emission lead to a more profit-
seeking, shareholder value maximizing focus.  
A move from Bee to Angel can occur after the management realizes their actual effect on their 
externalities, as was the case with Jaipur Rugs Company. This awareness and the change upwards can 
of course incur an even stronger establishment of their position on the horizontal axis as well. In the 
case of JRC, an opportunity to affect society was discovered, and by becoming aware of it and 
consciously pursuing it, the company was able to increase the effects. Moving the other way, from 
Angel to Bee, can also be regarded as possible. When changing management and owners, the 
company’s intentions will change before externalities will change due to the inertia effect. 
Implementing the new strategy and changing operations is a gradual, complex and resource intensive 
process. Changing a venture’s sum of externalities is difficult, since it is a sum, a result of many 
different factors. In other words, the venture’s entire value chain will affect the result, and 
controlling this is often very difficult. Therefore assumptions must be made as to the effectiveness of 
the changes introduced. 
A factor that can induce a movement from Angel to Poser, is actually the same factor that can create 
a lock-in in the Poser class; a company blinded by their own rhetoric (Hagen, 2008). As management 
knows their venture is an Angel, they become less vigilant in their efforts to internalize externalities, 
leading to the venture overlooking future negative externalities. In time, this can lead to their sum of 
externalities becoming negative, moving the company from Angel to Poser. 
Moving from Poser to Angel was the case with Vestergaard Frandsen, and will occur when the 
company’s intentions are transformed to concrete action and a real change in operations and 
activities. This is as previously mentioned not an overnight process, and therefore the Poser class can 
work as an intermediary as the company moves from Shark towards Angel. 
A venture moving from Shark to Bee is something that can be hard to imagine happening. However, 
an “accidental” change in operations leading to a positive change in externalities may still happen. 
Moving from Bee to Shark can however occur when the accidental change is discovered and changed 
back, but also if a change in management has changed the intentions and the Bees class only is an 
intermediary on the company’s way back to Shark due to the inertia effect. 
We have no empirical evidence showing a direct, diagonal move in the framework. Because of the 
inertia effect in the horizontal movement and since a positive change in intentions leading to a 
negative impact on externalities and vice versa, a diagonal movement is something we consider 
improbable. We therefore deem it unlikely that movement between both Angels and Sharks, and 
Posers and Bees in both directions as improbable. 
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Figure 7: All observed, possible and improbable movements in the framework 
Figure 7 shows all movements that have been observed in the case ventures, and the movements 
that seem possible in other ventures. The case ventures we have chosen to exclude in this paper do 
not exhibit any movement other than those observed in the included cases. 
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We have developed a conceptual framework in order to classify ventures based on their social efforts 
and social effects. This has allowed us to view the nature of all types of ventures in a new light. While 
we have shown that the framework can be used to describe real-world ventures both in a static state 
and as they move when changing policy, mission and operations, there are several mechanisms in 
the framework that have proven to complicate its dynamics (such as inertia effects). It is our hope 
that this framework will prove useful for both researchers and managers in the future. 
There are some limitations to the framework. It is based on a qualitative case study conducted over a 
limited time period using historic data provided by the company themselves. This reduces the 
generalizability of our findings, and further research is recommended to explore the model and look 
at other aspect we may have overlooked. 
Additionally, the axes are binary, which we chose as a simplification in order to describe the 
businesses in a practical way. However, reality is not as black and white, and most ventures will have 
very different coordinates even in the same class. Regardless, the framework has proven capable of 
classifying ventures according to their social effort and effect. 
We suggest that further research on the framework focus on the dynamics. More specifically we 
suggest looking at Posers, which we assume will become more populated as increasing CSR focus and 
impact awareness will push businesses towards changing their policy.  
We also recommend examining the implications of the axis in the framework being binary. We 
realize that reality is not binary, and recommend research where each class can be further divided. 
Inserting scalable units on the axes can also prove useful in order to get a relative view of ventures. 
This can help to further illuminate the correlation between social effort and effect. 
In addition to the aspects presented for further research, our framework offers implications for 
managers. Our results from analyzing the framework, and especially its dynamics, may help 
managers become aware of the lock-in effects that may occur and the dynamics in moving from one 
class to another. Many may also experience a revelation when realizing that there are inertia effects, 
which can help them prepare for the mismatch between intentions and results. We believe that our 
framework, though abstract in its design, can have real-life applications. 
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In this paper, a method is developed to measure the social effort and social effect of ventures. To do 
this, a conceptual framework developed in a previous paper is extended and a set of measurable 
indicators for each dimension in the framework is found. A survey is conducted to collect data in 
order to search for a correlation between the two dimensions “social effort” and “social effect”. The 
findings from the survey indicate a linear correlation between the two. More importantly, we find 
that the ventures are spread in a continuous scatter on the two dimensions. The implication is that 
the division between social ventures and traditional ventures does not provide an accurate picture. 
All ventures can be said to have social properties, and the relevant question is to what degree. As 
society expects more social responsibility from ventures, a tool for measuring the social efforts and 
effects of all ventures is due. We believe that our framework provides useful assessment tools for 
investors and opens for further research in the field of social entrepreneurship. In addition, we have 
through our research shown possible applications for managers by developing reports on how the 
respondent ventures scored in the framework. 
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Ventures across all sectors are increasingly accepting that they have a social responsibility to society 
as they adapt corporate social responsibility (CSR) into their operational thinking (Hamann, 2004), 
voluntarily file sustainability reports (Hooghiemstra, 2000) and shape their strategy around shared 
value creation (Porter & Kramer, 2011). At the same time, the number of social ventures is steadily 
growing (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006) and new innovative, business models are 
appearing designed to fund the efforts of both for-profit and non-profit social ventures (Brugmann & 
Prahalad, 2007). 
On the heels of these trends come the skeptics who argue that CSR functions mainly as PR initiatives 
for traditional (for-profit non-social) ventures (Frankental, 2001; McKibben, 2006) and that 
innovative for-profit social ventures dilute their social goals in their pursuit of income (Foster & 
Bradach, 2005). In short, the sincerity and actual effect of the social efforts made by both traditional 
and social ventures is being questioned. To address this issue, generic methods of evaluating the 
social input and output of all types of ventures are increasingly in demand. It could be that 
attempting to classify ventures as either “social” or “traditional” is not as important as the literature 
seems to dictate. Instead, a discussion of all ventures’ role in society may be appropriate. 
In a previous paper (Gamnes & Berntsen, 2011) we designed a conceptual framework for comparing 
social effort and social effect in all types of ventures based on theoretical aspects from both 
traditional economics and social entrepreneurship literature, and we demonstrated this framework 
using a set of case ventures. This framework was generic in nature, and intended to classify both 
social ventures and traditional ventures on the same criteria. While the framework itself provides a 
classification of ventures’ efforts and effects, its qualitative nature complicates its use in mapping 
ventures relative to each other. We will use the same framework in this paper, but because we need 
to score ventures relatively to each other, we will adapt the framework to quantitative use. First, we 
will extend the dimensions of the framework to be continuous scales on both the social efforts and 
the social effects dimensions. As the variables in the framework are difficult to measure directly, we 
will find a set of indicators to evaluate ventures based on social entrepreneurship literature as well as 
CSR and sustainability reporting standards. We will conduct a survey to measure the indicators 
among ventures in different industry sectors, countries and at different maturity stages.  
The results from the survey will provide a basis for evaluating the correlation between efforts and 
effect, and to investigate the continuity of scores on both dimensions. We propose that the real 
world is not black and white; that ventures are not divided simply into social ventures and traditional 
ventures. We expect our findings to strengthen this proposition. In addition, we believe that our 
evaluation method can provide useful insights for managers of ventures when assessing their social 
performance.  
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The framework we are using to analyze ventures evaluates them on two dimensions: social efforts 
and social effects. These two dimensions are abstract concepts that are only useful for describing 
ventures in a conceptual sense. When applying the framework to empirical data, these concepts 
must be expressed by some properties or variables of the ventures examined. The concept of social 
efforts can be expressed by the variable social intentions – that is, a venture’s position on the social 
efforts dimension depends on to what degree the venture has intentions of creating social value or 
offsetting social cost. Social effect is explained in terms of a variable we call the sum of externalities. 
This can be understood as the sum of social cost and social value creation the venture imposes on 
society. Both the abstract concepts and the variables expressing them were originally developed in 
our previous paper on the same subject (Gamnes & Berntsen, 2011). In this paper, we aim to develop 
a set of measurable indicators that allow us to infer the actual levels of social effort and effect. 
Both dimensions are comprehendible on the abstract level, as well as on the venture property level. 
However, the framework as presented in the previous paper is only usable for a qualitative 
evaluation of ventures. This is because neither variable – that is, neither the venture’s intentions nor 
the venture’s sum of externalities – are directly observable and as such cannot be measured.  Both 
are complex constructs with numerous dependencies which can vary with contextual factors such as 
business sector or geographical region of operations. Even so, we believe that there exists some 
definite, objective score for each variable that transcends context. Looking to statistics, we find that 
latent variables – that is, hypothetical constructs that cannot be directly observed, such as the 
venture properties we are examining – can be determined by identifying an appropriate set of 
measurable indicators, and extrapolating the latent variable from these (Bryman, 2001; Jöreskog & 
Goldberger, 1975). Figure 1 illustrates how the two dimensions are broken into increasingly 
observable factors. 
Abstract concept Social effort Social effect 
Latent variable Intentions Sum of externalities 
Indicators ? ? 
Figure 1: Three layers of the effort and effect dimensions 
Before we can measure the indicators that will let us infer ventures’ social effort and effect, we need 
to identify what they are and how we should go about rating their relative importance. 
The social effort dimension of the framework describes the intentions that ventures have to create 
social value. To understand this dimension, imagine the following oversimplification: either a venture 
exists to address a social problem, or it exists to make money for its shareholders. Clearly, the real 
world is more nuanced than this. While a manager in a traditional for-profit venture is expected to 
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make profitable choices, his choices will always be affected to some degree by the venture’s 
corporate values and by his sense of social responsibility. How strong this sense is, and how well the 
venture’s values conform to society’s needs, will vary from venture to venture. Similarly, a manager 
in a social venture is expected to make choices that benefit the cause the venture is working for, but 
he also needs to ensure the activities of the venture are financed.  
If the social efforts of a venture aren’t black-and-white, our social effort dimension cannot be binary. 
Because we do not believe ventures have negative social intentions (at worst, they have no social 
intentions), this dimension should encompass a continuum of social intentions ranging from “no 
efforts made” to “social efforts are the venture’s only concern”. Because we have seen that there 
can be many different reasons for a venture to make social efforts, and as we have already 
established that we cannot observe the latent variables directly, we need to find a set of indicators 
for a venture’s total social efforts. 
The social intention of a venture is the sum of perceptions, motivations and ideas that the employees 
of that venture operate under, that guide employees in their efforts. It could be argued that the sum 
of these indicators reflects this intention, but we will instead turn the equation around and claim that 
the intention is caused by the very same indicators. An example that explains this claim can be found 
in times of organizational change; a venture changes its mission statement and values first, then 
attempts to alter the organizational attitudes and action patterns to match these – not the other way 
around. This leads us to believe that the indicators of social intentions are formative rather than 
reflective in nature. We will therefore construct a formative index (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2006) 
for evaluating a venture’s social intentions. 
We need to base measurement on the indicators that most strongly express a venture’s intentions. 
In our previous paper we looked at ways of measuring the social intentions of ventures, and found 
two indicators that proved important (Gamnes & Berntsen, 2011):  
 Social venture: Social ventures, whether for-profit or non-profit, exist primarily to serve 
some social mission, meaning they have strong social intentions. As there are no universal 
objective ways of telling if a venture is a social venture or not (Dees, Haas, & Haas, 1998), our 
indicator will be whether or not the managers of the venture consider it to be a social 
venture or not. 
 Mission statement: Although there are no uniform structures to mission statements, they 
can be expected to reveal information about the venture’s corporate philosophy and desired 
public perception in addition to describing the venture’s raison d’être (Pearce II & David, 
1987). Non-profit organizations’ mission statements often describe who the key stakeholders 
are, and how they should be served (Bryson, 1988). Our indicator is therefore whether or not 
the mission statement contains references to social values. 
While both indicators help us identify ventures with strong social intentions, we must also identify 
indicators that describe social ambitions that are less explicit. Not being a social venture is not the 
same as making zero social effort. We therefore include the following indicators from CSR and social 
reporting literature in our social effort indicator list: 
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 Sustainability reporting: Participation in voluntary sustainability reporting programs indicate 
a willingness to evaluate social and environmental impact. This kind of reporting is not 
directly tied to improvement efforts, but the indication of efforts made is strong, especially 
when reports highlight areas with potential for improvement (Hedberg & von Malmborg, 
2003). 
 Social responsibility and environmental responsibility branding: Marketing brands as 
socially or environmentally responsible creates expectations of social responsibility, both 
externally and internally (Hagen, 2008). As both employees and customers become 
influenced by the branding, the communal attitudes in the venture are shifted, and decision-
making is affected. 
 Corporate level strategies to address social issues: Constructing and implementing 
strategies to address social issues are signs that ventures are serious about social impact 
(Diller, 1999). 
 ISO 14000 and ISO 26000 compliance: ISO 14000 is an international standard series 
concerning environmental management, created to guide companies to obtain processes 
with low environmental impacts. ISO 26000 is a relatively new (2010) international standard 
governing social responsibility. While certification exists for ISO 14000, ISO 26000 is only 
meant to offer guidance and not certification. Compliance with either series is voluntary, and 
efforts to comply with the criteria in the standards are thereby clear indicators of social 
effort (Johnson & Greening, 1999). 
In addition to helping us identify social efforts from non-social ventures, these indicators also serve 
as triangulation for validating the efforts of social ventures. 
The social effect of a venture’s activities is expressed by the venture’s sum of externalities, as we 
showed in our previous paper (Gamnes & Berntsen, 2011). The sum of externalities encompasses all 
effects the venture has on its surroundings, excluding the direct financial impact on its shareholders 
and the direct financial impact from taxation1. Ideally, there would be a correlation between the 
intentions of the venture and these effects, as the intentions describe the impacts the venture aims 
to effect. As such, the sum of externalities could be determined by a formative index, using the 
venture’s intentions as indicators (or rather, the indicators for the venture’s intentions). Doing so, 
however, would imply that intentions and effects are the same things, which clearly is not true 
(Gamnes & Berntsen, 2011). Luckily, there are more strongly correlated sources available. The 
externalities of a venture are clearly reflected in the venture’s surroundings. For that reason, it 
makes sense to search for a set of reflective indicators (Coltman, Devinney, Midgley, & Venaik, 2008).  
Because externalities by definition affect bystanders’ utility, and because utility is subjective, the sum 
of externalities should ideally encompass all positive and negative effects a venture’s actions has on 
all conceivable bystanders (Gamnes & Berntsen, 2011). This means we should search for indicators in 
                                                          
1
 While there might be tacit social effects from taxation, investigation of these effects is outside the scope of 
this paper. 
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any area where a venture can create social value or incur social costs. In reality, some of these 
indicators describe powerful effects, while others are almost insignificant. As it is practically 
impossible to map all effects, our indicators should capture those areas where ventures are likely to 
have the greatest impact on society.  
To find these areas, we look to the growing body of social investment assessment mechanisms that 
are emerging in the financial universe. This includes voluntary reporting initiatives, as well as several 
social responsibility and sustainability indices, which typically have requirements stating which 
indicators should be reported on or investigated to make ventures eligible for inclusion. There is a 
large degree of overlap between the indicators used in these mechanisms, which we interpret as a 
sign that they cover the most important areas of social effect. We have chosen the following four 
already established evaluation tools to synthesize our indicators. They were chosen based on their 
established position in sustainability and social reporting (Gjølberg, 2009). 
 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a network-based organization that has developed a 
world-wide sustainability reporting framework. The framework consists of principles and 
indicators for measuring and reporting economic, environmental and social performance. 
We chose to include indicators from this framework because of its extensive and well-
founded set of indicators, its large number of reports collected, and its status in CSR 
reporting literature. (Brown, de Jong, & Lessidrenska, 2009) 
 The Global 100 index is a ranking of the top 100 sustainable and financially performing 
companies that is presented annually at the World Economic Forum. We included indicators 
from this index because they are based on work by internationally recognized investment 
agencies in cooperation with social enterprises. 
 The FTSE4Good index series is an index series created by FTSE, a company owned by the 
Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange. This index adjusts for sector and 
geographical region, which provides interesting perspectives for our indicators. 
 The Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) is an index focusing on creating long-term 
shareholder value by including more than just financial factors in valuating ventures. We 
included the index because of its importance in sustainable investment. 
Each of our four sources of indicators contained a set of evaluation criteria organized in some 
grouping unique to that particular source. Our process for synthesizing our own set of indicators 
from these started with breaking each set into its key components. While the various sources had 
sorted their evaluation criteria in categories or groups, we went down to the bottom level and 
collected each individual criterion. This resulted in a total of 195 different criteria. These components 
from all four sources were then mixed together, and similar entries were eliminated by either 
removing duplicates or combining closely related criteria. In the end, we had 36 unique, mutually 
exclusive indicators as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Process of breaking down indicators from sources into key components 
Having found the 36 unique indicators, we sorted them into 14 aspects to provide a more adequate 
grouping for analysis. Each aspect covers between one and four indicators from the original 36. We 
then sorted the aspects into three classes: environmental indicators, human and labor rights 
indicators and socio-economic indicators. The classes were derived from our own grouping, while 
also taking the indicator-sources’ division into account. The classes allow us to analyze results and 
implications on a more categorical level. This process is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Process of grouping indicators into classes and aspects 
The resulting classes, aspects and indicators are shown in Table 1. 
  
Global Reporting Initiative 83 indicators in 7 categories 
Global 100 11 key performance indicators 
FTSE4Good 89 indicators in 6 categories on 3 levels 
DJ Sustainability Index 12 criteria in 3 categories 
36 unique 
indicators 
36 unique 
indicators 
Environment class 
Human and labor rights class 
Socio-economic class 
7 aspects 
4 aspects 
3 aspects 
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Table 1: The social effect indicators, grouped into aspects and classes 
Class Aspect Indicator 
Environment 
ISO 14000 certification Certification 
Waste management 
Total waste 
Waste reduction initiatives 
Recycling 
Packaging and products 
Water Use 
Total water use 
Water reuse initiatives 
Water saving 
Energy Use 
Total energy use 
Efficiency activities 
Emissions 
Total carbon emission 
Toxic emissions 
Deforestation 
Deforestation involvement 
Initiatives to prevent deforestation 
Wildlife 
Species threatened by extinction 
Wildlife preservation initiatives 
Human and Labor 
rights 
Human Rights 
Child Labor 
Human rights screening 
Health and Safety 
Injuries 
Diseases 
Deaths 
Gender Equality 
Women rights activities 
Female-male ratio 
Anti-discrimination policy 
Employee Welfare 
Employee compensation 
Working hours 
Bargaining agreements 
Socio-Economic 
Knowledge creation 
Innovation 
Average employee education level 
Employee training 
Community Development 
Local supplier sourcing 
Local hiring 
Local infrastructure investment 
Local development programs 
Corruption 
Internal anti-corruption policy 
Supplier anti-corruption screening 
 
While we discovered a descriptive set of indicators for both social effort and social effect, not all 
indicators are equally important when evaluating ventures’ social efforts and effects. We therefore 
rated the indicators so they carried different weight. Unfortunately, there was no easy way to 
objectively rate the indicators. For instance, how much more important is a social mission than 
environmental branding when assessing a venture’s social intentions? Does a high innovation rate 
counterbalance the negative externalities tied to deforestation? Are the externalities tied to child 
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labor more severe than the ones for corruption? As there was no clear way of addressing these 
questions objectively, we needed to rely on subjective assessment.  
We chose a rating scale of 1 to 10, where 1 was the least important and 10 the most, and we rated all 
the social efforts indicators on this scale. The first two social efforts indicators – whether the venture 
is a social venture and whether its mission statement contains a social mission – are the strongest 
indicators, and should be treated as the most important ones, so we initially set both as 10, and 
rated the others relative to these. For the social effects indicators, we first rated each class of 
indicators, before rating each aspect within each class relative to each other. Doing this ensured the 
aspects’ impact on the total effect score was adjusted by its class rating. 
It is important that the indicators are weighted from society’s point of view, as it is the effort to 
influence and impact upon society we are trying to measure. Realizing that our own subjective rating 
would not necessarily reflect that of society, we triangulated our rating by asking ten peers – 
students at NTNU – to rate the same indicators on the same scale. We used the average results from 
this triangulation to adjust the final rating. The deviation between the ratings was surprisingly low, 
and we therefore felt that the average result provided a somewhat representable rating. Table 2 
shows the final social efforts indicator rating, Table 3 shows the rating of the social effect classes, and 
Table 4 shows the rating of each social effect aspect. The rating is rounded off to the nearest integer 
value, and the weighting is rounded off to the nearest whole percent score. 
Table 2: Rating of social efforts indicators 
Indicator Rating Weight 
Self-definition as social venture 9 22% 
Mission statement containing social value creation 9 22% 
Participation in reporting initiatives 4 10% 
Social responsibility branding 1 2% 
Environmentally friendly branding 1 2% 
Corporate-level strategy for environmental issues 4 10% 
Corporate-level strategy for human and labor rights issues 3 8% 
Corporate-level strategy for socio-economic issues 4 10% 
Compliance with ISO 14000 3 7% 
Compliance with ISO 26000 3 7% 
 
Table 3: Rating of social effect classes 
Category Weight 
Environment 35% 
Human and labor rights 30% 
Socio-economics 35% 
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Table 4: Rating of social effect aspects 
Category Aspect Rating Weight 
Environment 
ISO 14000 certification 5 13 % 
Waste management 6 15 % 
Water Use 7 17 % 
Energy Use 6 15 % 
Emissions 8 20 % 
Deforestation 4 10 % 
Wildlife 4 10 % 
Human and Labor 
rights 
Human Rights 6 30 % 
Health and Safety 6 30 % 
Gender Equality 3 15 % 
Employee Welfare 5 25 % 
Socio-Economic 
Knowledge creation 7 35 % 
Community Development 7 35 % 
Corruption 6 30 % 
 
Because we will conduct a survey, the indicators were adapted into questions. Therefore we did not 
rate the indicators directly, but rather rated the aspects relative to each other. The answer 
alternatives for each question in the survey were rated from +1 to -1. Our rating of the survey 
questions, as well as the possible scores from the answer alternatives for each question, is found in 
Appendix C. 
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In order to investigate the correlation between social effort and effect in our framework, we 
constructed a quantitative, non-experimental, relational research design (Bryman, 2001). To find how 
ventures scored in the framework, we needed some way of measuring the indicators we had 
constructed. Practical constraints dictated we could not obtain an objective measurement of all 
indicators for a sufficient number of ventures. Because of this, we decided on a self-reporting 
mechanism; managers would report through a survey (to the best of their knowledge) a 
measurement of each indicator for their venture. In order to quickly and efficiently get a high 
number of responses, we created a self-completion questionnaire that we distributed electronically. 
When developing the questionnaire for gathering the data, we chose to use closed questions since 
they are easier to answer for respondents and were likely to increase our response rate (Bryman, 
2001). In addition we wanted answers that are easy to compare in order to be able to readily apply 
our framework to the responses.  
Our indicators needed to be adapted into questions suitable for a self-completion questionnaire. In 
the process, we needed to take care to avoid language that could influence a respondent’s response. 
This process necessarily required us to rephrase our questions from how the indicators originally 
were defined. In order to reduce the deviance between the original aspects and the questions, we 
iteratively went back to the aspect the questions belonged to in order to verify the question’s 
relevance (see Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4: The question generation process 
To find our respondent sample, we used our academic network to get in touch with CIOs or CEOs. As 
we wanted to test a generic framework, we sampled ventures regardless of contextual factors such 
as type, size and geographical region. This resulted in a total of 55 potential respondents, to whom 
the questionnaire was distributed to by email. 
To increase the response rate, and test the managerial applications of the framework, we promised 
each respondent a report with their results. 
We have taken measures in order for the results to be as realistic and unbiased as possible. We 
informed all respondents in advance that their answers would be anonymized, to reduce the risk of 
Main 
Category 
Aspect Indicators Questions 
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self-selection. The questions themselves ran the risk of revealing the aspect being measured, which 
could lead to respondents adapting their answers in order to score higher in each aspect. To lower 
the risk of this occurring, we have tried to develop questions that obscure the aspect being 
investigated. 
When answering the questionnaire, the respondents replied to likert questions designed to measure 
the indicators we had designed. Each likert question belonged to one of two groups: either the social 
effort or the social effect indicator group. Because we were ultimately trying to find a total score on 
each of these two dimensions, the likert question replies were summed for each group to form a 
summative likert scale, providing a total score (Trochim & Donnelly, 2006). 
As we wanted to assess patterns and trends in the data, we were not looking for a large sample or 
specific results to test. Therefore no statistical analysis has been conducted. By analyzing patterns in 
graphs instead of numbers, we were able to interpret the results in a more general and intuitive 
sense, which let us look at the larger picture instead of focusing on specifics. 
While our method allowed a cheap, convenient and quick way to get a high number of responses 
(Bryman, 2001), it ran the risk of resulting in inaccurate or incomplete data. Managers could easily 
overvalue their own venture’s score on the indicators. To reduce their incentives to do this, the 
managers were informed in advance that their answers would be anonymized. Another potential 
problem results from the fact that self-completion questionnaires do not offer complete insight into 
each respondent’s venture. As researchers, we did not have the opportunity to follow up on areas 
where the respondents were uncertain to gain a thorough understanding of each case, so we risked 
missing data that could have resulted in different scores.  
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We invited CIOs and/or CEOs from 55 ventures across all industry sectors in different countries to 
participate in the survey.  From these, we received 19 replies from ventures in Norway (13), India (2), 
Switzerland (1), USA (1), Sweden (1) and the UK (1), resulting in a response rate of 35%. This 
response rate might seem surprisingly high, especially considering that the questionnaire was of 
substantial length, containing over 50 questions. However, it should be kept in mind that the 
response rate was increased as respondents were contacted through our network at NTNU. The 
distribution in venture type, size, age and geographical region, provided an appropriate sample for 
the generic framework. Table 5 shows the results from the survey. 
Table 5: Questionnaire scores 
ID SI SE SEnv SHLR SSE Industry Sector NP #E Est. HQ 
1 0,02 0,03 -0,01 -0,04 0,09 Consumer Staples No 3 2011 Norway 
2 0 0,13 0,00 -0,05 0,17 Information Technology No 5 2010 Norway 
3 0,38 0,28 -0,03 0,13 0,18 Consumer Discretionary No 2 2010 Norway 
4 0,21 0,05 0,00 -0,06 0,12 Information Technology No 7 2011 Norway 
5 0,58 0,20 -0,02 0,08 0,14 Materials No 23000 1905 Norway 
6 0,31 0,26 0,02 0,07 0,17 Health Care No 110 1993 Norway 
7 0,45 0,36 0,01 0,14 0,21 Industrials No 1044 1997 US 
8 1 0,48 0,02 0,19 0,27 Health Care No 160 1958 Switzerland 
9 0,79 0,48 0,07 0,18 0,23 Information Technology No 3 2010 India 
10 0,47 0,29 0,03 0,08 0,18 Information Technology No 10 1996 Norway 
11 0,6 0,28 -0,02 0,12 0,18 Industrials No 60000 1896 Sweden 
12 0,79 0,27 0,01 0,08 0,18 Consumer Discretionary No 230 2006 India 
13 0,56 0,15 0,00 0,03 0,11 Humanitarian Yes 0 2011 Norway 
14 0,5 0,21 0,00 0,05 0,16 Consumer Staples No 30000 1654 Norway 
15 0,45 0,29 -0,02 0,10 0,21 Consumer Discretionary No 4 2008 Norway 
16 0,67 0,28 -0,04 0,10 0,22 Energy No 20000 1972 Norway 
17 0,67 0,28 -0,04 0,08 0,24 Energy No 80000 1909 UK 
18 0,23 0,30 0,03 0,08 0,19 Consumer Discretionary No 170 1973 Norway 
19 0,76 0,47 0,09 0,13 0,26 Humanitarian Yes 430 1865 Norway 
- 0,52 0,28 0,01 0,09 0,19 (Average value for each score)   
The table columns are as follows: ID (the respondent ID), SI (score, intentions), SE (score, sum of 
externalities), SEnv (score in environment class), SHLR (score in human and labor rights class), SSE 
(score in socio-economics class), industry sector, NP (Non-profit or not), #E (number of employees), 
Est. (the year of venture establishment), HQ (country where main office is situated).
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The purpose of this paper was to develop a method for evaluating the social efforts and social effects 
of ventures. We also wanted to look at the correlation between the two dimensions. In order to 
explore possible implications of our evaluation method, we illustrated the data using graphs allowing 
us to look for patterns and trends. 
The graph in Figure 5 shows a scatter plot of the survey respondents’ social effort and social effect. 
The social intentions axis ranges from 0 (meaning “no efforts are made”) to 1 (meaning “social efforts 
are the venture’s only concern”) while the sum of externalities axis ranges from -1 to 1.2 With a few 
exceptions, there appears to be a pattern of linear correlation between the two variables, 
represented by a dashed line in the figure. This is intuitively correct, as positive social intentions 
indicate a dedication for improving the sum of externalities of a venture. However, the externalities 
depend on many different aspects that are not necessarily considered in the venture strategy. That 
there still is an apparent correlation is a sign that the social efforts and social effect of ventures are 
indeed connected.  
 
Figure 5: Intentions and sum of externalities from survey respondents.  
A factor that supports the realism in the linearity of our results is that our sample does not contain 
any ventures in transformation processes in which their social intentions or sum of externalities are 
undergoing major change. In such processes, there is likely to be a misalignment between the two 
dimensions because of inertia effects – social effect changes are complex processes that take time 
(Gamnes & Berntsen, 2011).  
                                                          
2
 The survey we conducted limited sum of externalities results to score between -0.45 and +0.74. 
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While there are strong signs of a correlation, we must also consider the possibility that our apparent 
linearity is caused by experimental error, such as the data being affected by the way our 
questionnaire and indicators were developed. We have indicators on all three classes in both the 
social efforts and in the social effects part of the questionnaire. This could lead to biased answers in 
the social effects part of the questionnaire as the respondents are inclined to match their answers in 
the social efforts part. On the other hand, in the social effects questions we ask about more fine-
grained aspects, and not the overall class of effects. This disconnects the two parts of the 
questionnaire somewhat, and forces the respondents to closely consider their responses.  
Another interesting observation is that none of the ventures in the survey score negatively on the 
sum of externalities dimension. Given that our data accurately represents reality, most ventures have 
a positive sum of externalities. 
Considering the accuracy of our data, some possible sources of error should be examined. Our 
indicator rating values are based on subjective inputs, and run a risk of leading to non-accurate 
results. We have as previously mentioned triangulated our values with those of peers, but the group 
we asked does not accurately represent the mean of society, and even if they did it is not clear that 
the indicator rating should be conducted by consensus. Another source of error is self-selection: 
ventures that know they will score low on the sum of externalities are less likely to respond to the 
survey. Because we have anonymized the results, this will be offset to a certain degree, but the 
problem is not eliminated. Finally, managers of the ventures asked are biased, and their responses 
will be colored by their need to make their venture look good. To reduce the potential for this to 
occur, we have as previously pointed out tried to develop questions that obscure the real indicators 
that are being answered. This makes it hard for managers to adjust answers to achieve a higher 
score. In addition, anonymization reduced incentives for managers’ bias. 
While we cannot claim to have eliminated all potential sources of error in our data, we have taken 
steps to address each of them. Assuming that none of the sources of error has influenced the results 
to a significant degree, we have discovered that most ventures do not in sum inflict negative 
externalities. There may be examples of ventures that do, but the existence of such ventures is by 
definition not beneficial to society, which is why governments try to force ventures to internalize 
externalities in the first place. Ventures who inflict net negative externalities must therefore navigate 
a business environment characterized by laws and taxes designed to prevent them from being a 
burden on society. We find it unlikely that many ventures can survive for long under such conditions, 
which is a possible explanation for the fact that few ventures fall on the negative side of the sum of 
externalities dimension. 
Seeing that we are measuring a sum of externalities, ventures that score low in one class of 
indicators can compensate by scoring higher in another. This is the case with one of the respondents 
- a major oil production company. This company scored negatively in the environmental class but 
scored positively in the socio-economic class, where the company did especially well with regards to 
innovation and knowledge creation. In total, the company had a positive sum of externalities. Even 
so, it is clear that there are areas where they can improve. 
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The class-specific scores on sums of externalities are shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Class-specific sums of externalities 
In the environmental class, ventures in general score lower than in the other classes, but it is also the 
most collected class. There can be several reasons for this, but we believe that the current focus on 
environmental issues in today’s society play a significant role. Implementation of carbon quotas, 
intensive public scrutiny and strict regulations in global markets force ventures to be aware of and 
take steps to reduce their environmental footprint (Garriga & Melé, 2004). In many industries 
however, emissions and environmental effects are inevitable, which combined with the regulations 
leads to a collected, but low score for our respondents. 
All of our sample ventures score high in the socio-economic class. This is partly explained by sample 
bias: our sample consists of several knowledge intensive ventures, and few non-tech ventures. This 
will of course create a focus towards knowledge creation and innovation, which will affect the socio-
economic score. In addition, the ventures in our sample which are not high-tech, such as a large non-
profit humanitarian organization, score highly on their focus on local sourcing and corruption 
policies.  
In the Human and Labor Rights class, we see the largest spread between the ventures, which is as 
expected. We have a wide variety of ventures in our sample, and this class of aspects is the most 
exposed to variations in awareness. Human and Labor Rights is not something that early phase 
companies, for instance, will prioritize, which will give them a low score.  
To further investigate the correlation between efforts and effects, we looked at each class of 
externalities and compared the score with the venture’s strategy to address issues in this class. The 
results from each class are shown in Figure 7. 
  
Figure 7: Class-specific average sums of externalities with and without a class-specific strategy 
-0,10 0,00 0,10 0,20 0,30
Sum of externalities 
Socio-Economic
Human and Labor Rights
Environmental
Environment Socio-Economic Human and Labor Rights 
No strategy
With strategy
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The figure shows the relative average sum of externalities for ventures with and without corporate-
level strategies to affect their output in the three classes of externalities. We see that in the socio-
economic, and human and labor rights classes, a corporate strategy within the class seems to lead to 
a more positive sum of externalities. However, the environment class shows the opposite case: it 
seems that a strategy to reduce the environmental footprint leads to a larger footprint. This seems 
counterintuitive at first, but it can be explained by the fact that environmental transgressions are 
heavily taxed, so ventures will always need to account for this without having a clear strategy to do 
so. The other two classes of indicators are less taxed. In these classes, a clear corporate agenda for 
preventing negative externalities can have effective results that will show on their sum of 
externalities. 
Our results indicate linearity between the dimensions in the framework independent of number of 
employees, country of operations and type of venture. Our indicators have been generalized to apply 
to all ventures, and we believe that the wide range of questions would even out extreme results from 
different contextual factors. However, based on our relatively low number of respondents, we 
cannot claim that our work is generalizable. From what we have learnt, we believe that more context 
specific criteria could ensure a more fair scoring system for all ventures. The FTSE4Good Index series, 
one of our sources of indicators, uses a sector specific rating system, where certain industries have 
stricter criteria for inclusion on certain indicators. One possible improvement of our framework is an 
adjustment to include a similar system with contextual consideration in the framework. 
The social effects indicators do not include as many areas on the positive externalities side as the 
negative. This is because most of the factors in our sources of indicators are designed to uncover 
negative impacts, not positive. The result of this is that social ventures in particular to a certain 
degree may be misplaced in the framework – especially if their efforts are in areas our indicators fail 
to capture. While we have based our indicators on known and well-established indexes and rating 
systems, there is still room for improvement. 
As already discussed, the indicator rating is based on the subjective opinions of a small group of 
people. When improving the framework, this is something that should be addressed. It should be 
kept in mind that the indicators are there to measure the actual effect on society, and as such an 
objective rating based on the cost on society from the various factors could yield more accurate 
results.  
Our only point of measurement of the indicators was the survey we conducted. In order to get truly 
objective measurements on a venture’s performance, it is necessary to look beyond the evaluation 
from the venture’s management. Supplementing the survey with careful document analysis and 
stakeholder interviews is likely to produce a more accurate measurement.  
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An aspect we have not investigated is the potential social effect of taxation, in which taxes on one 
negative externality can help to better other externality classes by governmental intervention. 
Similarly, revenue-based income tax has not been considered. These are social economics points that 
have an influence on the venture’s total impact on society. By focusing on sums of externalities 
instead of on total social impact we have ignored these factors. In a total impact evaluation, 
however, they too should be considered. 
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Our results support our idea that there is not, in general, a clear division between social ventures and 
traditional ventures. It is instead a gradual continuum where all ventures have some degree of social 
effects. In other words, as the borders separating the two become more blurred, the discussion 
should not be about what type of venture they are, but how they affect their surroundings. We 
believe that this discussion can more fruitful in that it is not how a venture achieves its effects that is 
important, but rather which effects are pursued, and to what degree they are achieved. 
An interesting observation we made is that none of the respondents scored negatively on the sum of 
externalities. We expected to find that most traditional ventures would be scoring poorly on this 
dimension, as it is in the nature of business to externalize costs (Monks, 2005). However, the data 
shows that while ventures may have negative externalities in some areas, they can make up for it in 
other areas. 
We have also found that there was a clear correlation between social efforts and social effects 
regardless of contextual factors and venture types. In addition, we have managed to apply the 
framework to find trends and correlations on a more fine-grained level than the major social efforts 
and effects dimensions. Other interesting findings include that the variation in environmental 
externalities was low in the sample, and that the corporate level strategies did not necessarily 
impose a positive effect in this class as opposed to the other two classes. 
The results show that the framework can be assumed to work independent of industry and context, 
but that more industry specific and contextual consideration can be made in rating the indicators to 
provide more valuable industry applications. The indicators themselves have proved useful in 
evaluating the latent variables intentions and sum of externalities, as the results are within the 
bounds of what we consider to be realistic. While we will not claim that the indicators are fully 
developed or that they accurately represent the complete picture, we believe they are a good basis 
for further refining and evaluation. 
There are several aspects we would recommend for further research. The indicators we have used 
should be further evaluated, the indicator rating should be verified, and new indicators that can 
further improve the realism of the total score should be considered. If future research is conducted 
by survey, the questionnaire should also be further refined. We recommend considering alternative 
ways of measuring the indicators, however. Developing a method of measuring the indicators 
through document analysis and stakeholder interviews could provide a more objective and accurate 
way of evaluating ventures. 
It is our belief that the framework can prove more useful in specific industries and settings if context-
specific adjustments are made. This idea was implemented in the FTSE4Good Index. Adapting the 
indicators and the rating system to various specific industries can provide a more accurate analysis 
tool, as well as making the tool more relevant for managers. 
We envision that the framework can be used on a larger quantity of ventures, which can allow for a 
more thorough analysis of the actual correlation between efforts and effects. By looking at specific 
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industries or countries, the framework can prove to be a useful tool in finding where these sectors 
have the greatest potential for improvement, or where governments should focus their efforts in 
terms of incentives or taxation. 
One interesting observation we made was that none of the ventures scored negatively on the sum of 
externalities dimension. While this means that all the ventures we investigated are, in sum, beneficial 
to society, it also underlines the fact that we have no clear line separating between social and non-
social ventures. Keeping in mind that this framework was proposed in order to avoid a division of 
ventures into traditional and social, a possibility for future research is still to attempt some sort of 
sub-classification of ventures on the positive side on the externalities axis. 
The framework can be used as a management tool for evaluating how well a venture performs 
according to their efforts and purpose. If researchers manage to build industry specific databases 
with a larger number of ventures, managers can use their own position relatively to the industry 
average to evaluate how they perform instead of using the zero-point as a criterion for good-enough 
performance. As we have seen that none of the ventures scored negatively on the effects dimension, 
the zero-point criterion may not be a good benchmark for managers. We also believe that the tool 
can be used by managers who want to determine which areas they should focus their efforts in. By 
looking at the more fine grained data from each indicator or indicator class, the company can find 
where they score poorly and initiate relevant actions based on the findings. Assuming that the 
correlation we saw between the two dimensions is linear, managers can also use this to evaluate 
where the venture is compared to where it should be according to its intentions in the framework. 
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Below is a brief description of each of the sources used for developing the indicators. 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a network-based organization that has developed a world-
wide sustainability reporting framework. Based on the Boston-based non-profit CERES’ “Global 
reporting initiative” started in 1997, the first official guidelines were released in 2000 and have 
continually been updated since. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has been a 
partner since 1999, securing a world-wide platform for exposing the GRI, and today more than 1400 
companies have reported based on GRI’s framework. The framework consists of principles and 
indicators for measuring and reporting economic, environmental and social performance. 
Website: www.globalreporting.org 
The Global 100 index is a ranking of the top 100 sustainable and financially performing companies 
that is presented annually at the World Economic Forum. The initial selection is conducted by a set of 
financial advisory companies (e.g. Global Currents and Phoenix Global Advisors) choosing the top 
10% of sustainability and financial performers from a set of more than 3500 market stocks. The 
resulting list of 300 companies is assessed against 10 equally weighed environmental, social 
transparency and governance indicators, resulting in the top 100 companies. According to the Toby 
Heaps, president of Corporate Knights, the companies “…*are not+ perfect, but they’re the best we’ve 
got”, (www.global100.org, 2011) illustrating that this is a relative ranking, and that there is always 
room for further improvement. 
Website: www.global100.org 
The FTSE4Good index series is an index series created by FTSE, a company owned by the Financial 
Times and the London Stock Exchange. While FTSE have several indexes used by investors for finding 
objective market information, the FTSE4Good index series measures the performance of companies 
that meet globally recognized corporate responsibility standards. In their assessment of companies, 
FTSE pays special attention to rating the general impact of various industries before evaluating 
individual companies. In addition, certain high-risk countries are flagged for high social impact, and 
operation in these countries is also calculated into the index series. Companies meeting certain 
minimum criteria is then included in the index. 
Website: www.ftse4good.com 
The Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) is an index focusing on creating long-term shareholder 
value by including more than just financial factors in valuating ventures. The index score is based on 
the Corporate Sustainability Assessment of SAM Research and DJSI also include an external 
assurance report from Deloitte to ensure compliance with the defined rules set by DJSI. The data is 
collected through the SAM questionnaire, document analysis and direct interviews with companies. 
The index is not a ranking, but an inclusion-based index where companies clearing a certain 
requirement are indexed. 
Website: www.sustainability-index.com 
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The 14 social effects aspects we found are listed below with a short description of each, and 
reasoning for why they are included. It should be noted that some of the aspects can only reflect 
negative effects, while others can reflect either positive or negative effects. 
ISO 14000 certification 
The ISO 14000 series is an environmental management standard series that helps organizations 
minimize the effect of their operations on the environment. The ISO 14000 certification is in other 
words a good indicator for how the venture affects the environment. 
Waste management 
Pollution and resource consumption are effects of waste production that negatively affect society. 
Recycling initiatives and resource efficiency offset this effect, and are both indicators that should be 
considered under this aspect. 
Water use 
Total water usage can provide an indication as to how the company affects water supplies and the 
market price of water. In many parts of the world, access to drinking-grade water is severely limited. 
Additionally, high water consumption, especially in dry areas, can also affect the local eco-system, 
leading to second-degree problems such as ruined crops or affected wildlife. By reducing water 
consumption a venture can reduce their negative impact. 
Energy use 
The amount of energy a company uses has direct impact on energy supply and prices in the areas of 
operations. In addition, with today’s energy production, one can assume that large parts of the 
energy will come from non-renewable energy sources, leading to pollution and thereby affect the 
environmental footprint of the venture. 
Emission 
Emissions of greenhouse gasses are the main cause of climate change and are governed by the Kyoto 
Protocol. Toxic emissions may present an immediate danger to local biodiversity as well as to 
humans. Both are strong indicators of a venture’s environmental footprint. 
Deforestation 
Deforestation can damage biodiversity in local areas, and can potentially damage adjacent local 
industries depending on this biodiversity. Deforestation also robs the local population of resources 
and, in some cases, might lead to land-slides and other natural catastrophes imposing severe 
negative externalities. 
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Wildlife 
Operations that affect endangered species and wildlife in general, impose negative externalities. 
Wildlife extinction prevention and biodiversity security are prioritized areas for the United Nations 
Environment Program, and we therefore deem it important for our effects measurement. 
Human rights 
Human rights and child labor prevention are prioritized areas for the UN, which has its own Human 
Rights Council. Ventures should be conscious as to whether or not their business is involved with 
potential breaches of international guidelines and regulations. This should also be the case for a 
venture’s suppliers. Breaches of human rights agreements incur severe negative externalities. 
Health and safety 
Work-related injuries, diseases and deaths incur direct costs on society as workers get incapacitated, 
as well as affecting the well-being of employees. A venture’s track record on health and safety issue 
offers a good indicator of its labor rights impact.  
Gender equality 
In a fair and equal society, gender discrimination is not tolerated. While we readily accept that 
gender quotation on employment and salaries can be detrimental to a venture’s operation (e.g. 
hiring less qualified personnel in order to reach quotations), inequalities of opportunity stems from 
and leads to discrimination in all layers of society. As this is a self-reinforcing phenomenon, a 
venture’s approach to gender equality is an indicator of its effect on society. 
Employee welfare 
Employees of a venture are a part of society, and as such, their respective utility must be considered 
when considering society as a whole. Competitive compensation, fair working hours and the rights to 
form collective bargaining agreements are indicators of stakeholder transparency, labor rights and 
employee welfare. 
Knowledge creation 
Knowledge drives society forward, and most innovation gains the society in general. Employee 
education, on-the-job training and courses help drive innovation, increase employee satisfaction and 
create equal opportunities for employees in the company. 
Community development 
Building up local communities in areas of operation is important to help develop society and prevent 
communities from becoming locked into a role of cheap hand-labor with poor infrastructure. This 
topic is an important piece of social awareness, shown by its central position in Porter and Kramer’s 
work on creating shared value (Porter & Kramer, 2011). Ventures involved in community 
development in their areas of operations impose positive externalities. 
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Corruption 
Involvement with corruption is the same as non-compliance with the law in a way that damages 
society severely. Any such involvement is a strong indicator of negative social effects. 
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Social effort and effect
S u r v e y  r e p o r t
As consumers, investors and employees 
are increasingly concerned with the role 
of companies in society, managers need 
better tools to evaluate their social effect. 
Over the past decades, academics have 
established frameworks to describe both 
the causes and the mechanics of this 
change in the company’s role. At the 
same time, the non-prof it social sector 
is growing rapidly, and for-prof it social 
entrepreneurship is becoming more 
common. A result of these trends is that 
the line between traditional ventures and 
social ventures is blurring. Unfor tunately, 
economics, business and entrepreneurship 
literature usually deal exclusively with 
either the ventures in the business sector 
or ventures in the social sector when 
evaluating impact. In future discussion of 
social effor t and social effect, we believe it 
will make sense to treat all ventures in the 
same framework. This survey is par t of a 
research project attempting to construct 
such a framework.
based on the master thesis of gøran berntsen and bård gamnes page 1
Thank you for participating in our survey. 
You are receiving this report because you 
participated in the survey “Social efforts and 
effects”, which was distributed in May 2011 as 
part of our Master thesis at NTNU. This report 
is based on the data you submitted, as well as 
the aggregated data of the other participants. 
The data you have submitted is anonymized for 
all purposes other than this report, and this report 
will not be distributed.
By submitting the survey on behalf of your 
company, you have contributed greatly to our 
research. Your evaluation is part of the data set 
that we will use for verifying the theoretical model 
we have developed. 
It is our hope that this research will help advance 
the f ield of social impact evaluation. Further, we 
believe our framework can lead to more powerful 
and accurate tools for scholars, off icials and 
managers when evaluating the social effect of 
ventures.
Thank you again for your participation,
Sincerely,
Gøran Berntsen and Bård Gamnes
Graduate students, NTNU
based on the master thesis of gøran berntsen and bård gamnes page 2
The Researchers
Gøran Berntsen is currently 
an MSc. graduate student 
at the NTNU School of 
Entrepreneurship, with a 
technical background from the 
f ields of nano materials and 
energy technology. Besides 
being a student, he is the co-
founder and CEO of a scientif ic 
board-game company. 
Email: goranb@stud.ntnu.no
Phone: +47 41 47 06 10
Bård Gamnes is an MSc. 
graduate student at the NTNU 
School of Entrepreneurship. His 
technical background is from 
mechanical engineering and 
ICT. He is a co-founder and 
chairman of the board of a 
scientif ic board-game company. 
Email: gamnes@stud.ntnu.no
Phone: +47 95 12 12 35
subject: Sample Venture
respondent: cio@sampleventure.com
response date: june 1, 2011
Total score
Companies are scored on two dimensions: their intentions which ref lect 
their social efforts, and their sum of externalities which ref lects their social 
effects. Social intentions are indicated by the company’s purpose, mission, 
values and branding. This dimension results in a score from 0 to 100. A 
score of 0 implies no social efforts and a score of 100 implies pure focus 
on social impact. 
A company’s “sum of externalities”, means the total impact on third 
parties from the company’s activities. Companies score from -100 to 100 
on this dimension, where -100 means the company incurs severe costs for 
society, and 100 means the company creates signif icant value for society. 
In order to score a company on this dimension, three classes of social 
effect indicators are evaluated: environmental impact, human and labor 
rights impact and socio-economic impact.
Sum of externalitiesNegative Positive
In
te
nt
io
ns
Survey participants
Sample Venture
based on the master thesis of gøran berntsen and bård gamnes page 3
Environmental impact indicators
Any environmental footprint imposed by a company is a negative externality, while activities that preserve 
the environment lead to positive externalities. In the environmental class of indicators, we measure 
companies on waste management, water use, energy use, toxic emissions and greenhouse gas emissions, 
deforestation and wildlife impact and compliance with the international standar series for environment 
protection, ISO 14000. Environmental factors count for 35% of the total sum of externalities.
Human and labor rights indicators
A venture’s impact on society can be measured by how the venture relates to people. Breach of human 
rights or labor rights agreements are indicators of negative externalities, while work to promote these 
rights are indicators of positive externalities. In this class, we measure companies on human rights policy 
(including child labor policy), health and safety standards, gender equality and employee welfare.
Socio-economic indicators
The socio-economic class of indicators encompass the impact a venture have on society traditionally 
associated with social costs and benef its. Under this class lies knowledge creation (specif ically innovation 
and education), community development and corruption.
Negative Positive
Environmental Score
Negative Positive
Human and Labor Rights Score
Negative Positive
Socio-Economic Score
Sum of externalitiesNegative Positive
In
te
nt
io
ns
Survey participants
Sample Venture
The indicators used for social effect evaluation are based 
on the growing body of social investment assessment 
mechanisms that is emerging in the world of f inance. 
Specif ically, criteria from the following sources have been 
used:
The Global Repor ting Initiative, collecting more than 1400 
sustainability repor ts annually from some of the world’s 
largest companies offers a set of off icial guidelines for 
sustainability repor ting.
The Global 100 Index is a ranking of the top 100 sustainable 
and f inancially performing companies, presented annually at 
the World Economic Forum.
The FTSE4Good Index Series is a corporate responsibility 
compliance index created by the Financial Times and the 
London Stock Exchange.
The Dow Jones Sustainability Index, created by the Dow 
Jones Indexes and SAM, provides benchmarks to asset 
managers managing sustainability por tfolios.
Indicator sources
How should you interpret your results?
The social intentions axis measures to what degree your company is 
a social venture - that is, to what degree you operate with a social 
mission. Most ventures are expected to lie on the lower half of this axis, 
unless they are social ventures.
The sum of externalities axis shows your company’s social impact. First 
of all, keep in mind that a score on the positive side on the externalities 
dimension is always a good thing” This means the activities of your 
company in sum makes society better off. The further to the right you 
score, the better your activites are for society as a whole - but not 
necessarily for your shareholders. 
As you can see in the f irst graph, showing the scatter plot of intentions 
and externalities, there is almost a linear correlation between the 
two. This is intuitively realistic, as most of the respondents represent 
established, stable ventures, where status-quo between intentions and 
effects has been achieved to some degree.
As a manager in your company, it can be useful to note your position 
relative to an imagined linear graph. If your venture is on the left side of 
the graph, it can indicate that you are not able to realize your intentions 
into actual effect. If you are positioned on the right side it means that 
your venture are “doing more good” than your intentions indicate. 
based on the master thesis of gøran berntsen and bård gamnes page 4
How did we arrive at the total score?   
The questionnaire you have answered, asked questions about indicators 
within either intentions, or each externality class (environment, human 
and labor rights, socio-economic). For the sum of externalities, each 
question-alternative gave us a score from -1 to 1 depending on the 
gravity of the alternative’s impact on society. For intentions each 
alternative was rated from 0 to 1. Then the questions were weighted 
depending on its signif icance to the total output, to provide us with a 
total score.
Scoring low in one class 
and high in another?
Because of the nature of some 
industries and businesses, many 
ventures will score low in one class, 
but higher in others. One example 
can be companies in the oil and 
gas sector, which are likely to score 
low in environment, regardless 
of how good their intentions and 
effor ts are. However, since they 
are knowledge intensive and prone 
to more innovation, they will score 
higher in the Socio-Economic class. 
For your venture, you should 
therefore look at your total score, 
then on each class, and see where 
you score high, and where you score 
lower. If you feel that this matches 
your impression of reality, then 
you probably have been able to 
realize your intentions to real effect. 
If not, then you should consider 
investigating the possible factors 
inf luencing your score to see where 
your effor ts should be placed.
If you have any questions regarding this report, do not hesitate to contact us at goranb@stud.ntnu.no or gamnes@stud.ntnu.no
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